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We show that multiple equilibria exist in a model of bank run with moral hazard. Further-
more, this is true even with noisy signals on the economic fundamentals. We argue that the
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We investigate the conditions under which multiple equilibria due to coordination failure
can be ruled out when individual agents have noisy signals about the fundamentals of an
economy. Morris and Shin (1998) apply the idea of Carlsson and van Damme(1993) to
a model of currency crisis where, with common knowledge of fundamentals, self-fulﬁlling
currency attacks lead to multiple equilibria. They show that even a small amount of noise
about fundamentals yields a unique equilibrium1. The insights generated by their paper
extends to other market situations where multiple equilibria may exist due to coordination
failures. These insights present a major challenge to any attempts that seek to explain either
currency attacks (as in Obstfeld (1986)) or bank runs (as in Diamond-Dybvig (1983)) using
models with self-fulﬁlling multiple equilibria. Indeed, Jeanne and Masson (2000), using a
model with multiple equilibria to study the experience of the French franc from 1987-1994,
explicitly acknowledge the criticism of their approach implied by the uniqueness result in
Morris and Shin (1998).
Our purpose here is to address this challenge to models with self-fulﬁlling multiple equi-
libria by studying the robustness of the uniqueness result with noisy signals about funda-
mentals.
We change the original context of Morris and Shin (1998) paper from currency crisis to
banking. Ever since Diamond and Dybvig’s seminal (1983) paper, the phenomena of bank
runs arising out of coordination failure has been extensively studied2. Subsequently, several
authors have applied the methodology developed by Morris and Shin (1998) to models of
banking (see for example, Goldstein and Pauzner (2000), Morris and Shin (2000)).
A key assumption in Morris and Shin (1998) applied to models of banking is that with
complete information, the space of fundamentals can be partitioned into three non-empty
subsets, an unstable region where the bank always fails, a middle region in which there is
multiple equilibria and a stable region where the bank always survives. Assuming all three
regions are non-empty, a small noise in the observation of the true value of the fundamentals,
implies that it can never be common knowledge that fundamentals are in the middle region.
It is this feature that is crucial for the uniqueness result in Morris and Shin (1998) to go
through. Both Morris and Shin (2000) and Goldstein and Pauzner (2000) show the existence
of a unique equilibrium with noisy signals on fundamentals with this assumption.
Here, in contrast, we do away with the assumption that all these regions are non-empty
and show that multiple equilibria exist even with noisy signals on the fundamentals of bank-
ing. In section 4, we study two diﬀerent cases where this assumption no longer holds. In
the ﬁrst case, we assume that both the stable and the unstable regions are empty. In this
case, even with noisy signals on fundamentals, it remains common knowledge that these
fundamentals are in the middle region. From this it follows that both bank runs and bank
survival continue to remain equilibrium outcomes. This case serves as a useful benchmark
for our main result. In order to prove this result, we investigate the less restrictive case
when only the stable region is assumed to be empty. In this case, even with noisy signals on
fundamentals, it remains common knowledge that the fundamentals lie in either the unstable
or in the middle region. Under this assumption, we show that when the fundamentals fall
below a certain critical value, the bank always fails, but above that same critical value, both
1For further applications of this uniqueness result, see Corsetti, Morris and Shin (1999) and Morris and
Shin (2001a, 2001b).
2See for instance Freixas and Rochet (1998) and the references contained therein.
1self-fulﬁlling bank runs and bank survival remain equilibrium outcomes.
Is the case with an empty stable region economically relevant? First, we examine the
optimal decision of banks when faced with a potential collapse and derive endogenously the
assumption of an empty stable region. When the proportion of early withdrawal is high, a
bank may decide to defend itself by liquidating some of its long-term assets or borrowing
from the outside third party to pay for withdrawal demand. We will argue that because of
the problem of moral hazard, mis-management is not observable at least for a short time
period. This means that the outside third party may not be able to distinguish between a
bank that is facing a liquidity problem and a bank that is mis-managed. Any outside third
party considering lending to troubled banks may ask for a high loan rate, imposing costly
conditions or even ration out loans. Under these circumstances, we show that banks will
decide to collapse regardless of fundamentals when (a) the credit rationing in the market
for bank loans is severe, or (b) the cost of bank loans is high. In all these cases, the stable
region is empty.
It is important to distinquish the point we make here from other criticism that gives rise
to multiple equilibria, for example, the introduction of public signal. Atkeson (2000) in his
discussion of Morris and Shin paper argues that publicly observed market prices, if priced
in equilibrium, can serve to coordinate agents’ action because they aggregate information
across all individuals thus revealing which equilibrium will actually occur. Boonprakaikawe
and Ghosal (2002) and Hellwig (2000) also show, via introducing relatively informative public
signals, that the result of Morris and Shin is not robust and multiple equilibria are main-
tained. Contrast this to our paper where we will show that even without the possibility of
publicly observed signals, e.g. when market prices fail to predict a crisis or reveal suﬃcient
information about the fundamentals, multiple equilibria can still arise in a model of banking
with noisy signals.
Second, a minimum size of the bank which is bounded away from zero can also be
justiﬁed if the bank’s asset portfolio has illiquid assets. By reinterpreting fundamentals to
represent an exogenous liquidity shock, we show that our model of banking can be derived
as a reduced form version of Diamond and Dybvig (1983)’s model of banking where the
proportion of illiquid assets is derived endogenously. Finally, we show that the assumption
on the minimum size of the bank follows from the analysis of Goldstein and Pauzner (2000)’s
model of banking with risk-sharing when the sources of external and internal ﬁnance available
to the bank are limited.
In the ﬁnal section of the paper, we discuss some empirical and policy issues that arise
from our analysis. One implication of Morris and Shin (1998) (see also Morris and Shin
(1999a)), is that the onset of a crisis should be anticipated as the fundamentals evolve to
approach the critical value needed to trigger a speculative attack. On the other hand, our
main result implies that a ﬁnancial crisis should be largely unanticipated by markets. In
fact, a wide array of empirical papers that supports the view that episodes of ﬁnancial and
currency crisis are largely unanticipated. A related issue is on the role of policy interventions
that prevent a crisis. Our main result here suggests a role for policy interventions that
coordinate the expectations of traders on the “right” equilibrium. In contrast to Morris
and Shin (1998), our results suggest that suspension of convertibility, restrictions on capital
ﬂows, lenders of last resort can be rationalized as policy interventions that prevent runs due
to self-fulﬁlling expectations.
In the next section we present a model of banking with moral hazard and show that self-
fulﬁlling multiple equilibria can exist. Section 3 enriches the analysis by allowing random
2state of nature. Section 4 relaxes the assumption of perfect information, letting the signals
observed on the fundamentals to contain a noise error. Then, in section 5, we show that even
with noisy signals, there can exist multiple equilibria in models with moral hazard problem.
In section 6, we compare our banking model to that of Diamond and Dybvig (1983) and
Goldstein and Pauzner (2000). Section 7 discusses empirical and policy issues. The last
section concludes.
2 The model
In our model, a bank is a ﬁnancial intermediary whose existence results from its acquirement
of speciﬁc skills in monitoring investment projects (entrepreneur). It borrows from both
equity holders and depositors. For simplicity and without loss of generality, assume that
equity is used to ﬁnanced the ﬁxed cost of setting up a bank. The return on equity depends
on the investment return while the depositors held a demand deposit contract similar to that
of Diamond and Dybvig (1983) with sequential service constraint. Thus, withdrawal demand
is serviced on a ﬁrst come ﬁrst served basis with late depositors receiving nothing in a case
of bank failure. There are three time periods,  =0 12. Assume that there are a continuum
of depositors and equity holders, indexed by  and  respectively, each of Lebesgue measure
1. A single individual is endowed with one unit of the perishable good at time period  =0 .
Note that in this model, equity holders are included essentially to simplify the analysis and
we do not consider their role actively 3.
Depositors preferences are identical and are summarized by the utility function
(0 1 2)=1 +2. A deposit contract speciﬁes a return of 1  1 in period  =1and
2  1 at  =2when one unit of endowment is deposited at  =0 . Investment projects
ﬁnanced through deposits can be described as a non-convex technology that converts the
inputs of the perishable good at  =0to outputs of the perishable good at  =1or  =2 .
One unit of input yields 	(1 − 
), 	1 at  =1and (
) at  =2where 
 is the
proportion of investment left to  =2and  denotes action or eﬀort of bank’s manager.
(
) is assumed to be continuous and strictly increasing in both arguments. Notice that
there is a mismatch of liquidity between the deposit contracts and long-term investment
technology, this essentially is the cause of ﬁnancial fragility in our model.
The order of events is as follow, at  =0 , the bank is set up through equity ﬁnance. Then
depositors are assumed to invest all their endowment in the bank. Together with manager
decision on the level of eﬀort, the deposits are used to ﬁnanced investment projects. At
 =1 ,e ﬀort creates a cash reserve of ˆ  stochastically dependent on the level of eﬀort with
probability distribution Φ( ˆ |) (and density ( ˆ |)) exhibiting an increasing strict monotone
likelihood-ratio property (MLRP). A proportion of deposit ( liquidity shock) 0 ≤  ≤ 1
then decide to withdraw from the bank. The bank will ﬁrst service the withdrawal demand
with its cash reserve ˆ  (). For simplicity we assume that the cost of liquidation is too high
compare to the cost of borrowing and thus the bank will always choose to borrow from an
outside third party which leaves 
 equal to one. The cost of borrowing is denoted by ()
where  represents the amount borrowed which is equal to  − ˆ  (). Also in this period,
the manager may decide to liquidate the bank if the utility he receives is lower than his
3Without whom, the return on demand deposit contract can be assumed to be increasing in investment
return to make the accounting balance sheet of the bank balanced. Note that the overall result will carry
through.
3participation value 4 in which case there will be no borrowing and investment projects will
be liquidated. Depositors who are early to withdraw receive 1until all the cash reserve plus
liquidation value, ˆ  ()+	 run out. Late depositors or those who wait until  =2(and
equity holder) get nothing, assume ˆ  ()+	 1.A t  =2 , if the bank does not fail,
the return on production, (1) will ﬁrst be used to repay loans. Then it will be used to
repay depositors while the bank’s manager receives a wage dependent on return, a penalty
dependent on the amount that bank owes to the lender and a disutility from eﬀort. He has
utility function (−) restricted to equal to 1 ((1)) + 2 (−()) −  ()5.N o t e
that when  ≤ ˆ  (), the bank do not have to borrow and the utility of the manager is
1((1)) + 2( ˆ  () − ) −  (). 1 and 2 is assumed to be increasing concave function
while  an increasing convex function. He also has a participation value of .L a s t l y ,e q u i t y
holders received the rest of the return.
With non-observable eﬀort and liquidity shock, there is a moral hazard problem with
regard to lender’s objective in maximising her proﬁts ()−. Assuming that the lender is




subject to {1 ((1)) + 2(()) −  ()} ≥ 
 ∈ maxarg{1 ((1)) + 2(()) −  ()}
Suppressing ˆ  and viewing  as a random variable with a distribution  (|) with
density  (|). The second constraint, the incentive compatibility condition, can ﬁrst be





[() − ] (|) (1)
subject to 1((1)) +
Z
∈(0]








where  is an upper bound on the amount of borrowing7
Let  and  be the multiplier for participation constraint and incentive compatibility
constraint respectively. Given that the ﬁrst order approach is valid8, a necessary condition








4Note that the existence of the bank require a continuity of manager eﬀort.
5The penalty on the amount owed can be think of as a wage reduction or other forms of penalty, such as
a cost to reputation and future carreer prospect.
6The lender can also be assumed to care about the level of production (1), maybe because it is the
central bank or the IMF. This does not eﬀe c to u rc o n c l u s i o no fi n c r e a s i n gc o s to fb o r r o w i n g .
7This can be set equal to ∞ or  ∈ [0∞) reﬂecting possibly lender’s endownment.
8See Jewitt (1988) for details.
4From the fact that  (|)= 
 (|)= 
(1−Φ(−|)) = (−|)9. Recall that the
distribution Φ( ˆ |) has a MLRP. Speciﬁcally, the likelihood-ratio
( ˆ |)
( ˆ | ´) is monotone in ˆ ,























  0.T h i sa l s o
implies that
	(|)
	(|) is decreasing in , see proposition 5 in Milgrom (1981). This condition is
intuitive as it means that higher eﬀort increases the likelihood that the amount of borrowing
needed is low. Using a similar argument as in Jewitt(1988), the multiplier  can be shown
to be positive, this is shown in appendix A. Therefore, the right hand side of 4 is decreasing
in  implying that () must be increasing in .
2.1 The minimum size of the bank
In this subsection, we will show that () increasing in  implies that there exists a minimum
size of deposits remaining such that the bank will fail if the amount of deposits remained
is lower than that minimum size or it will continue to be in business until  =2otherwise.
The minimum size requirement denoted by  =1−  where  is  such that
1((1 )) + 2(−( − ˆ  ())) −  ()=
where  is the level of eﬀort which solves the optimisation problem.
When , () increasing in  ensure that the cost of borrowing is increased which
in turn leads to lower utility gained for bank manager. Indeed, this will be lower than 
and the bank will fail. On the other hand, when  ≤ , the cost of borrowing will be
lowered such that the manager’s participation constraint is satisﬁed and the bank survives.
Notice that the proportion of deposits withdrawn  can be thought of as partly endogenous.
If depositors suspect that  is likely to be greater than  then many more depositors will
withdraw which will increase  itself, in our model, everyone will withdraw,  =1 ,a st h e y
are homogenous. This situation infact describes a multiple self-fulﬁlling equilibria where a
belief that the bank will fail will indeed lead to its failure and vice versa. Also, notice that
because () is increasing in ,  is decreasing in  and  is increasing in .
In addition, when  ≤ ˆ  (),  is  such that
1((1 )) + 2( ˆ  () − ) −  ()=
The above result carries over as an increase in  lead to lower utility, thus the bank fails
if  and survives otherwise. Again,  is decreasing in  and  is increasing in .I n
order to have  and  continuous in , we will assume that (0) = 0.
Next, we will show that three scenarios can arise depending on the participation value
.
i)  is high such that
1((1 )) + 2( ˆ  ()) −  ()  (5)
Condition5 represents a case where even when no deposit is withdrawn, participation
value is low such that the bank will always fail. Indeed, in this case, it is more likely that
there will be no banking at all. Denote this level of  by .
9 (|)=( − ˆ | ≤ |)
=1− ( ˆ | ≤  − |)=1− Φ( − |)
5ii)  is low such that
1((1 )) + 2(−(1 − ˆ  ())) −  () ≥ 
Here, the bank will survive even the highest possible withdrawal demand of one and never
fail. Denote this level of  by .
iii) The participation value is in the intermediate values such that  .
In this case, a withdrawal demand of size  =1or more precisely of the size 
(1 −  ) will liquidate the bank, otherwise the bank will continue to end period. There
are two equilibria, one in which everyone withdraw and the bank fails and the other where
no one withdraws leading to a continuation of banking. Note that the game which gives rise
to multiple self-fulﬁlling equilibria is that between bank manager and depositors. A large
withdrawal demand will make the bank manager decide to withdraw his eﬀort as the his
utility falls below the participation value. However, the opposite can be true. If depositors
suspect that the manager will withdraw his eﬀort, maybe because there is likely to be high
withdrawal demand, it will ensure that everyone will withdraw and the bank will fail.
3 Economic Fundamentals
Previously, we have assumed that return is dependent only on eﬀort and the size of in-
vestment. In this section return is made to depend on the fundamental of the economy or




, return function is given by (1) continuous and
strictly increasing in . Note that the fundamental is observed in  =1after the level of
eﬀort is decided. If the distribution of  is known, similarly to the above analysis, we can
suppress  and summarise its distribution in  (|) with probability density  (|).T h e
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This is the same as equation4, thus if 0 can be shown to be greater than zero then ()
must be strictly increasing in . The proof for 0  0 is similar to the earlier proof for
60 taking into account that
 R

1() (|)  0 if  (|) has a monotonic increasing
likelihood-ratio property10 which we will assume.
3.1 The minimum size dependent on 
In the previous section, we show that the minimum size requirement is increasing in .I f
we consider a given level of participation value , with similar arguments as previously, we
can show that the minimum size requirement depend on the level of fundamental ,i nt h i s
case it will be continuous and strictly decreasing in ,d e n o t eb y(). Agian this and the
result in the next subsection depend crucially on the condition that () is an increasing
function.
3.2 Perfect Information
In addition, analogous to previous result, when the fundamental is perfectly observed, the
following is true
i) When  is low such that
1((1 )) + 2( ˆ  ()) −  ()  (10)
The bank will always fail. We will call this region of the fundamental, the unstable region
θ = {| } where  is  such that
1((1 )) + 2( ˆ  ()) −  ()= (11)
ii) When  is high such that
1((1 )) + 2(−(1 − ˆ  ())) −  () ≥ 
The bank will always survive. Denote this region of fundamental by the stable region θ =
{| ≤ } where  is  such that
1((1 )) + 2(−(1 − ˆ  ())) −  ()=
iii) When the fundamental value falls between the unstable and the stable regions. There
are two self-fulﬁlling multiple equilibria, one with a bank run and the other with a bank
survival. Denote this region of fundamental as the intermediate region θ = {| ≤ }.
Also, note that there exist three non-empty regions of the fundamental, θ, θ and θ,
only if 0  ()  ()  1. The following remark summarises this result.
Remark 1 In this game, a depositor chooses an action from { !  "#  ! }.
Ap r o ﬁle of actions is a Nash equilibrium if no individual depositor has an incentive to
deviate. For each  ∈ θ(resp., for each  ∈ θ) there is a unique pure strategy Nash
10If the density	 (|)has a strict monotone likelihood then
(|2)
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7equilibrium where all depositors choose to withdraw (resp. choose not to withdraw) while for
each  ∈ θ, there are two pure strategy Nash equilibria, one where all depositors choose
{"#  ! }and another where all depositors choose { ! }.
This remark justiﬁes our interpretation of θ as the unstable region where the bank
always collapses and θ as the stable region where the bank always survives. θ is the
middle region where the there are two equilibrium outcomes: one where the bank always
survives and another where the bank always fails. This is the region with self-fulﬁlling
multiple equilibria: the ﬁrst equilibrium is the one where the bank always survives and
the second equilibrium is the one where there is a bank run and represents a coordination
failure. As we shall show, whether or not these three regions are non-empty is the key to
characterizing equilibria with noisy signals on the fundamentals.
4N o i s y s i g n a l s
When the assumption of common knowledge is relaxed and depositors no longer observe the
fundamental ,a t =1but instead receive a noisy signal about it. If the fundamentals can
be partitioned into three non-empty subset as above then as in Morris and Shin (1998) the
equilibrium outcome is unique. However, we will later show that with a problem of moral
hazard and thus increasing cost of borrowing, some economy, especially those of emerging
markets and less developed ﬁnancial systems can be faced with severe cost of credits or a
limit on borrowing which raise the minimum size requirement to above zero leading to an
empty stable region. In this case, there again arises multiple equilibria with self-fulﬁlling
expectation.
The timing of events is exactly as before except that now at  =1 , depositors cannot





,w h e r e% ()=[  − & + &] if  ∈ [ + & − &],w h e r e&0 is the term
representing noise in the fundamentals; % ()=[  + &] if  ∈ [+ &); % ()=[  − &] if
 ∈ (−&]11. A strategy for a depositor at  =1is a function from what he observes to his
set of actions which has two components { !  "#  ! }.Ap r o ﬁle of strategies
is a Bayesian equilibrium if no individual depositor has an incentive to deviate. Consider
the strategy proﬁle where every depositor withdraws if and only if observed signal $ is less
than ¯ $. Such a strategy proﬁle is called a strategy proﬁle with a switching point ¯ $denote
by '
12.





and θ are all non-empty, then for a suitable choice of &0 there exists a unique
Bayesian equilibrium in strategies with a switching point $∗. In particular, there exists
au n i q u ev a l u eo f ,d e n o t e db y
∗, such that the bank fails if 
∗ and survives if

∗.
Proof. The result of Morris and Shin (1998) follow through if we can show that de-





11This signalling structure is the same as in Morris and Shin (1998). We use this signalling structure to
maintain comparability with their results.
12Note that  ∈ ( −  + ), otherwise depositors know for sure that  ∈  or  ∈  and such a
strategy cannot be optimal.




'$ is the realised proportion of deposits not
withdrawn given '. See appendix B.
This remark shows that when the space of fundamentals can be partitioned into three
non-empty subsets, the ﬁrst region in which the bank always fails, a second region in which
there is multiple equilibria and a third region in which the bank always survives, the unique
equilibrium result of Morris and Shin (1998) applies to our model as well. When all three
regions are non-empty, a small noise in the observation of the true value of the fundamentals,
implies that it can never be common knowledge that fundamentals are in θ. Morris and
Shin’s proof then goes through in our case with a suitable relabelling of variables.
In contrast, the next proposition provides a set of conditions under which multiple equi-
libria persist even with noisy signals on fundamentals.




while θ and θ are
empty. Then, multiple equilibria exist and in particular self-fulﬁl l i n gb a n kr u n se x i s t .
Proof. If it is common knowledge that θ and θ are empty, for  ∈ [+&−&],w h e r e
&0,a te a c h$ ∈ [ − & + &], it remains common knowledge that  ∈ θ.T h e s a m e
remains true when  ∈ [+ &) and  ∈ ( − &]. Therefore, conditional on ,a te v e r y
signal $ ∈ % (), it is common knowledge that  ∈ θ. Therefore, the strategy proﬁle where
each depositor chooses {"#  ! } at each $ is an equilibrium. Further, the strategy
proﬁle where each depositor chooses { ! } at each $ is an equilibrium.
Proposition 1 serves as a benchmark case because it speciﬁes the key common knowledge
restrictions for the existence of multiple equilibrium outcomes. In the benchmark case, the
assumption is that θ, the region where the bank always fails and θ,r e g i o nw h e r et h e
bank always survives, are both empty. Under this assumption, even with noisy signals on
fundamentals, it remains common knowledge that the fundamentals are in θ.F r o m t h i s
it follows that both bank runs and bank survival continue to remain equilibrium outcomes.
For θ to be empty we need to have 1((1 )) + 2( ˆ  ()) −  () ≥ .T h i s i s
restrictive as it assumes that investment projects always guarantee a high enough return
at  =2 . On the other hand, we feel that the assumption of empty θ is more plausible
especially when the bank operates in an economy where the ﬁnancial markets are not fully
developed because a non-empty θ implies that if everyone withdraw, the bank will still
survive until the end period.
5E m e r g i n g M a r k e t s
Next, we argue that, with the problem of moral hazard, banks can be faced with severe
rationing or high cost of borrowing and decide to collapse regardless of fundamentals .T h i s
m a yb et r u ef o rb a n k si ne m e r g i n gm a r k e te c o n o m i e sw i t hw e a kﬁnancial system and moral
hazard problem. In such economies, θ is empty.
We examine the optimal decision of the bank under these scenarios and give a brief
intuition about the eﬀect of the costs of liquidation.
5.1 Credit rationing
Here we show that when there is severe credit rationing in market for bank loans, the stable
region θ is empty. In fact, credit rationing is observed in most ﬁnancial markets and in
9particular, in the market for bank loans (see for instance, Guttentag and Herring (1987)).
We can rationalize credit rationing in our set-up by observing that the market may not be
able distinguish between banks that borrow to ward oﬀ a liquidity threat and banks that
borrow because they are insolvent. Imagine two banks with apparently sound fundamentals.
One bank is solvent with severe liquidity problem. The other with moral hazard problem
where the bank’s management is at fault. As this is not observable by the outside parties,
it will not be reﬂected in the observed fundamentals. Thus it is reasonable to assume that
the third party acting as a lender of last resort may have a strong reservation about lending
to either bank as it can not, given a time limit, distinguishes between the two. Potential
lenders faced with uncertainty may ration the borrower as well as raising the rate to cover a
greater potential for loss especially, when as in our case, the solvency of potential borrowers
is not observed. Here we show a condition that imposes a limit on the amount that bank
c a nb o r r o wa b o v ew h i c ht h ec o s to fb o r r o w i n gw i l lb ei n ﬁnite. Let 
 be the value of 1 − 
such that
((1 )) + 2(−( − ˆ ())) −  ()=∀*
Denote the limit on borrowing by  and let  (
)=1− 
 − ˆ ()* We shall assume that
rationing by the markets is severe i.e. (0) = 1 − ˆ ()  .L e t
 be the value of 
 such
that  (
)=. Note that for any given ,i f

 the bank will collapse. Remark also
that 
  0. In addition, because the minimum size 
 is strictly decreasing in . Therefore,
∀, there exists 
0 such that 
 ≤ 
. This implies that there exists 

 such that the
bank will collapse regardless of  ⇒ θ is empty.
5.2 The cost of borrowing
Apart from the fact that banks may have limited access to credits, troubled banks, especially
when its solvency is not observed, may also be subjected to high rate of interest for loans.
Also the costs of borrowing does not only reﬂect the loan rates but among other things, the
transaction cost and more importantly the cost to its reputation. In order to borrow it will
have to convince the market that it is solvent. This, in itself, will damage its reputation as
being a worthy borrower and therefore, aﬀect the terms on which it will be able to borrow
in any future crisis13.
Consider the case when all depositors wish to withdraw,  =1(
 =0 ), and assume that
the cost of borrowing is high such that
1((1 )) + 2(−(1 − ˆ ())) −  ()  ∀*
Therefore when 
 =0and  =1− ˆ () the bank will always choose to collapse. By
continuity of () in 
, there exist e 
 close to 0 such that
1((1 )) + 2(−(1 − 
 − ˆ ())) −  ()  ∀
e 
*
Therefore, ∀, there exists e 
0 such that e 
 ≤ e 
. This implies that there exists 
e 

such that the bank will collapse regardless of  ⇒ θ is empty.
In contrast to proposition 1, the assumption of empty stable region is more plausible
than that needed in proposition 1. We show that even with this weaker assumption, multiple
equilibria exist.
13As Bagehot (1873) noted ‘Every banker knows that if he has to prove that he is worthy of credit, however
good maybe his argument, in fact his credit is gone...’. (quoted in Guttentag and Herring (1987)).
10Before we state the next proposition, we need the following deﬁnitions (see also Morris
and Shin (1998)). Let +($) be the aggregate proportion of deposits not withdrawn in period 1
when the value of signal is $.L e t)(+) be the realized proportion of deposits not withdrawn
in period 1 when the state of the fundamentals is ,g i v e n+. Under our assumptions, when







Further, for  ∈ [ + & − &],l e t(($+) be the expected payoﬀ of {"#  ! },g i v e n








Note that when  is close to  or , in particular, when  ∈ [+ &) and  ∈ ( − &],
the limits of the integrations must be adjusted.
Denote a strategy proﬁle with a switching point ¯ $ by ' and let (($') denotes the
corresponding payoﬀ.




. Suppose it is
common knowledge that  ∈  ∪  while  is empty, then multiple equilibria exist
and in particular self-fulﬁl l i n gb a n kr u n se x i s t .
Proof. As it is common knowledge that θ is empty, then at every signal $, it is common
knowledge that  ∈ θ ∪ θ. Therefore a strategy proﬁle in which every depositor choose






such that for all  ∈ (
∗], in addition, {"#  ! } is also
an equilibrium outcome. First note that if +($) ≥ +0($) for all $,t h e n(($+) ≥ (($+0)
for all $ and (($') is continuous and strictly increasing in $.This follows by arguments
analogous to lemma 1 and lemma 2 in Morris and Shin (1998). Further, observe that for
a suitable choice of &,w eh a v e% () ⊂ θ while % (¯ ) ⊂ θ.N o w , a d e p o s i t o r w i t h a
signal $ ∈ % () knows that  ∈ θ. Therefore, we have (($')  1 if ¯ $ ∈ % ().N e x t ,a
depositor with a signal $ ∈ % (¯ ),k n o w st h a t ∈ θ.F o re a c h ∈ θ, each depositor will
choose {"#  ! } if he expects that all other depositors will choose {"#  ! }.
Therefore, if every depositor expects every other depositor to choose {"#  ! },a s
there is a continuum of depositors, for an individual depositor with a signal ¯ $ ∈ % (¯ ),




such that (($∗' ∗)=1 .
Also, $∗ , ∈ % () and $∗ , ∈ % (¯ ). In words, a depositor with signal $ will choose { ! }
if $ ≤ $∗ and {"#  ! } if $$ ∗. Now, when the equilibrium strategy is '∗, )('∗) is
strictly increasing in  ∈ ($∗−& $∗+&). Further, when  ∈ ($∗−& $∗+&), 0 ) ('∗)  1
and at  = $∗ − &, )('∗)=0while at  = $∗ + &, )('∗)=1 . Further, for a suitable
choice of &,w h e n +2 & ∈ θ, )('∗) is equal to zero. In addition, )('∗) is continuous
in  and by assumption, () is continuous and strictly decreasing in . Therefore, there is
a unique value of  such that )('∗)=().D e n o t et h i sb y
∗* Therefore, when 
∗
the bank always collapses and when  ≥ 
∗ the bank can either fail or survives.
116 Comparisons to other models of banking
6.1 Liquidity shocks and minimum size
In this section, we argue that typically a certain proportion of the bank’s assets are always
illiquid and this feature makes banks inherently vulnerable to bank runs, thus ensuring that
 is empty. We reinterpret fundamentals of banking as liquidity shocks and show that the
model of banking presented in section 2 can be derived as a reduced form of the single bank
model of Diamond and Dybvig (1983) (hereafter D-D) where the proportion of the bank’s
assets that are illiquid is derived endogenously.
In (D-D), bank can achieve optimal risk sharing to its customers by oﬀering demand
deposit contract which transform illiquid assets into liquid liabilities. There are three time
periods,  =0 12 and two type of agents, tppe 1 and type 2 with a utility function of the
form
(1 2;Θ)=((1) if  is of type 1 in state Θ
= 	((1 + 2) if  is of type 2 in state Θ
where Θ represents the state private information, 1 and 2 denote consumption in period
 =1and  =2 .A t =0all agents are identical and choose to deposit with the bank. At
 =1agents privately learn their type and can choose to withdraw. At  =2returns on
production are realised and divided between the remaining depositors. In addition, both D-
D and our models assume long term production technology with a cost of early liquidation.
Demand deposit contract however oﬀers liquid liabilities with a ﬁxed interest rate 1 at
 =1 (1 is greater than the value of early liquidation of assets). In D-D when 1 is derived
from optimal risk sharing, 1 is strictly decreasing in the proportion of type 1 depositors,
- ∈ (01) when it is known ex ante. The return on investments at  =2 , 2 depends on 1,
the fraction of deposits withdrawn at  =1 ; ,a n daﬁx e dr e t u r nf r o ml o n gt e r mp r o d u c t i o n
at  =2 , .. 2 = .(1 − 1),(1 − ).





1 decreasing in  and 2 increasing in , 1  2. In our model, they are assumed to be
ﬁxed. However, we can incorporate a feature of the D-D 1 and 2 will be decreasing
and increasing in  respectively. Note also that proposition1 and proposition2 apply with
decreasing 1 and increasing 2*
In D-D, it shown (pages 410-411) that there exists an upper bound of the fraction of
deposits withdrawn at  =1that allows banking to continue to  =2 . If the realised
fraction of deposits withdrawn at  =1 ,  , is equal to this upper bound, denoted by   =
(.−1),1(.−1), the rates of returns for both periods will be the optimally chosen interest
rate at  =1 , 1. If it is greater the bank will fail because all type 2 depositors will
rush to withdraw their deposits. Since the minimum size requirement is the lowest possible
proportion of deposits remaining in period 2 that permits the ongoing of production, the
minimum size () is equal to 1 −  . The upper bound   is a function of 1 and it is
increasing in , the fraction of type 1 deposits. Thus () is decreasing in  and ()  0
if  ∈ (01). Therefore θ is empty. Note that using the formula described in D-D, 0,
implies that ()  1. Thus it is in fact common knowledge that θ is empty as well
provided that 2  1.
Given the speciﬁcations of D-D, we have shown that the following properties are true:




 01. Therefore, it is common knowledge
12that  ∈ θ even when there is noisy observation of fundamentals. It follows that multiple
equilibria always exist.
We rule out “narrow banks” which requires that demand deposits be backed entirely by
safe short-term assets as this implies that socially optimal risk-sharing will not be imple-
mented. Our main result suggests that there is a discontinuity in the transition from “narrow
banks” to banks with a “small” maturity mismatch and a minimum size requirement due to
a non-convex banking technology. In this case, multiple equilibria persist.
6.2 Risk sharing
Here we present a slight variation of our model taken from Goldstein and Pauzner (2000).
The model is based on D-D, there are three time periods  =0 12,o n eg o o da n dac o n t i n u u m
[01] of agents. Each agent is born at  =0with an endowment of 1. With probability  an
agent is impatient and with probability 1− she is patient. Each agent learns their type at
 =1which is a private knowledge known only to them.
There exists a single bank who have access to the same production technology; one unit
of investment input at  =0yields either 1 unit of output at  =1or .() increasing in 
at  =2 . If the bank has enough resources to pay for all the early withdrawal, "1,1,
each agent receive a ﬁxed return of 1  1 for each unit of investment withdrawn at  =1
or a return of 2 = .()(1− "1),1 − " for each unit withdrawn at  =2where " is the
proportion of individuals demanding early withdrawal. However, if " ≥ 1,1, the bank fails
and liquidates all its investment, the proceeds of which are divided among the agents who
demand early withdrawal.
In this model as in our model, demand deposit contract oﬀers a ﬁx e dr e t u r no f1 greater
than 1, the yield given by the production technology at  =1 . It is this higher return of 1
which gives us a minimum size requirement which equals 1 − 1,1*Since 1 is a ﬁxed return
greater than one, 1 − 1,1 is a constant greater than 0. In order to ensure the existence of
the unstable region, it is assumed that there exists a non-empty set of  such that .()  1.
The existence of a stable region is however somewhat troublesome. As the minimum size
requirement is a positive constant regardless of the fundamental .I fa ta n y v a l u eo f all
agents decide to demand early withdrawals, the bank will fail regardless of how high the
fundamental value is. In Goldstein and Pauzner (2000), to ensure the existence of the stable
region, they assume the availability of external ﬁnance when the bank is faced with a crisis.
Here this means that the external lender of last resort must be able to provide the ﬁnance
greater than that of 1−1,1 of the overall deposit. Another way of ensuring the existence of
the stable region is to deviate slightly from the model and assume that when the fundamental
is extremely high, the technology yields a return larger than 1 even at  =1 14.I no t h e rw o r d ,
this assumption ensures the availability of the bank’s internal ﬁnance. However, as earlier
argued, both the external and internal ﬁnance may not be available to emerging market
economies with weak ﬁnancial systems because moral hazard problem can lead to severe
credit rationing and high cost of borrowing.
As in D-D, the bank through their demand deposit contract provides risk sharing between
patient and impatient individuals by transforming illiquid assets to liquid liabilities. We
argue that with this function comes a possibility of a bank run. As long as the bank continues
to oﬀer the demand deposit contract and the possibility of external lender or internal ﬁnance
14As long as this return is less than 1, the bank will still fail if all agents decide to withdraw at  =1 .
With optimal contract such as that of D-D, this will be less than 1.
13is never certain, this model as a special case of our earlier model can be applied to the result
of proposition 2.
7 Empirical and policy issues
In our model of banking, a crisis will occur if the fundamentals are weak enough i.e. when
 ∈ [
∗]. It can also occur as a result of a shift of expectation even when the fundamentals
are sound i.e.  ∈ (
∗¯ ]. Therefore, our model is able to explain both fundamental based
bank runs and panic runs. Indeed for a certain range of fundamentals, multiple equilibria
exist even with noisy signals about the fundamentals. This has applications to the study of
speciﬁce p i s o d e so fﬁnancial collapse and currency crisis such as the recent Asian ﬁnancial
crisis or the earlier Mexican Peso crisis in 1994. In our model of banking,
As pointed out by Thomas (1999), one implication of Morris and Shin (1998) (see also
Morris and Shin (1999a)), is that the onset of a crisis should be anticipated as the funda-
mentals evolve to approach the critical value needed to trigger a speculative attack On the
other hand, our main result, that there is a region of fundamentals with multiple equilib-
rium outcomes, implies that a ﬁnancial crisis can be largely unanticipated by markets. In
fact, Edwards (1986), using international data on the pricing of bank loans to developing
countries, ﬁnds that international ﬁnancial markets had only partially anticipated the debt
crisis of 198215.
Furthermore, the severity and contagion eﬀects of the crisis is certainly unaccounted
for purely by economic fundamentals. Several recent papers on the Asian ﬁnancial crisis
collected in Agenor et al (1999))16 argue that the phenomenon of contagion, where a crisis in
one economy triggers oﬀ a crisis in another institutionally similar economy, can be usefully
studied using models of multiple equilibria. Masson (1997) concludes that there is a role for
pure contagion which is not linked to macroeconomic fundamentals and can only occur in a
situation in which multiple equilibria were possible.
The implications of our model for policies to prevent banking crises are similar to that of
other multiple equilibria models of banking. Chang and Velasco (1998) apply the Diamond
and Dybvig (1983) model of banking to the study of the Asian ﬁnancial crisis to show that,
with ﬁxed exchange rates, domestic self-fulﬁlling bank crisis translates into a run on that
country’s currency (see Sachs, Tornell and Velasco (1996) for a related attempt to explain
the Mexico Peso crisis).Our analysis also suggests that the problem of maturity mismatches
can have a negative impact when capital markets are liberalized in emerging economies. The
problem of maturity mismatches can be aggravated by ﬁnancial liberalization and capital
ﬂows from abroad. Indeed, the nature of demand deposit contracts and of banks assets
coupled with potentially large changes in ﬁnancial ﬂows ensure that a surprised run resulting
from refusals to roll over debt can always occur. Rogoﬀ (1999), citing Diamond and Dybvig
(1983), makes a similar point. Fischer (1999) takes this argument further to make a case for
15Several empirical studies of other episodes of ﬁnancial and currency crisis make a similar claim. Examples
include Rose and Svensson (1994) on the crisis in currencies in the European exchange rate mechanism,
Jeanne (1997) (see also Jeanne and Masson (2000)) on the experience of the French franc from 1987-1994,
Flood and Marion (2000) on the crisis in the Mexican Peso in 1994.
16In particular see chapters 1, 2, 8, 9 and 10 in Agenor et al (1999). For a dissenting view, however, see
the chapter by Morris and Shin (1999a) in the same volume where they study the onset of currency attacks
by looking at a dynamic extension of their 1998 paper in which the fundamentals of the economy evolve
stochastically over time.
14an international lender of last resort.
Our model suggests two type of policy interventions, one that facilitate the ability of
agents to coordinate on the right equilibrium and the other which lowers the critical value
of fundamentals. that policy interventions that facilitate the ability of agents to coordinate
on the right equilibrium will prevent bank runs and other forms of ﬁnancial crisis. Deposit
insurance and suspension of convertibility (standstills) may prevent runs which are due to
self-fulﬁlling expectation. However, these policy interventions that facilitate coordination on
the right equilibrium do not make sense in models with a unique equilibrium since bank runs
are driven by fundamentals. In addition, there is a concern that such policies may cause
severe moral hazard problem and encourage large capital inﬂows which in turn aggravate
the problem. Financial liberalisation thus should be implemented with care and proper
punishment strategies and appropriate monitoring of bank should be in place to eliminate
the risk of moral hazard.
Another contrast is in the analysis of the role of transparency in preventing a ﬁnancial
crisis. In our analysis, public announcements that restore transparency coupled with policy
interventions that facilitate coordination,may prevent bank runs when  ∈ [
∗].H o w e v e r ,
this is may not always be true in models of bank runs with a unique equilibrium. Chan
and Chui (2000) in their paper which provide an extension of Morris and Shin (1998) ﬁnd
that in some cases currency attacks are prevented by non-transparency. Thus the role of
transparency in unique equilibrium models are somewhat unclear.
Some other forms of policy intervention can help reduce the probability of a crisis. In-
creasing the return in the end period and decreasing the minimum size requirement for all
level of the fundamentals will lower the critical value, make smaller the region where success-
ful attacks are certain and thus reducing the probability of bank runs for some non-empty
subset of fundamentals. Promoting an environment for business ventures and increasing ef-
fort of bank manager can lead to increase in the returns on investment and lower the critical
value. Raising manager’s eﬀort will also increase the cash reserve and indirectly lower the
minimum size requirement provided that disutility from higher cost of eﬀort is not too large.
This may suggest some beneﬁts from a policy scheme which rewards manager for higher
eﬀort and impose a penalty otherwise. As eﬀort is not veriﬁable, the level of reserve and
investment return will have to used as a guidance. A badly performed bank can be subject
to future investigation as a penalty and a deterrent for low eﬀort.
8C o n c l u s i o n
We show that even with noisy signals on fundamentals, multiple equilibria due to a coor-
dination failure exist in models of banking with moral hazard problem. We argue that the
conditions under which this happens can arise in a markets with weak ﬁnancial system. In
such a market, the cost of borrowing not only increases with the amount of borrowing but
can be too high such that the bank manager will decide to liquidate the bank. This high cost
reﬂects both the ﬁnancial aspect of the bank and also any terms and conditions that maybe
i m p o s e du p o ni t sm a n a g e m e n t .I na d d i t i o n ,t h e r ec a ne x i s tal i m i to nb o r r o w i n gs u c ht h a t
the bank will collapse when all of its depositors decide to withdraw.
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1((1))  0 and  0()  0. Since the covariance of  (−)
and 1,0 (−) is nonnegative as they are both increasing functions ,  must be nonnegative.
 cannot be zero as this will give a constant () and generally violates 3.
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where b  is  such that )(')=(). However, at $ depositors must be indiﬀerent between
{ ! } and {"#  ! },w em u s th a v e(($')=1  2.I fmax{$−&b } = $−&









[$ + & −b ]2
If )(b ')=(b )=1 , b and there exists a nonempty subset of  ∈ θ such that
the bank survives but this cannot be true as the bank always fails in the unstable region,
we must have b  . Similarly, b .R e c a l l t h a t 0  ()  ()  1,t h u s)(b ')=
1
2[b +&−$]=(b ). In other words, we must have )(b ')−(b )=0 . 
[)(b ')−(b )] = − 1
2.

b [)(b ') − (b )] = 1
2 − 0()  1
2. In order to satisfy )(b ') − (b )=0 ,a ni n c r e a s ei n$
will lead to a smaller increase in b . Therefore (($')= 1
2[$ +&−b ]2 is strictly increasing
16in $.
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